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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
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Mark Ciavarella, a former state judge, was convicted 
by a jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania of 
racketeering, honest services mail fraud, money laundering 
conspiracy, filing false tax returns, and several other related 
crimes. The charges resulted from the so-called “Kids for 
Cash” scandal that erupted in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania 
in late 2008. Ciavarella and his fellow judge, Michael 
Conahan, were accused of receiving over $2.8 million in three 
years from a commercial builder, Robert Mericle, and an 
attorney and businessman, Robert Powell, in exchange for 
helping to construct and operate juvenile detention centers 
and placing juvenile offenders there. Ciavarella complains 
that the District Court Judge overseeing his case was biased 
and should have recused himself early on, when Ciavarella 
asked him to do so. Ciavarella also assigns numerous trial and 
sentencing errors, which we discuss in detail below.
1
  
 
Over the course of several years, Ciavarella committed 
hundreds of juveniles to detention centers co-owned by 
Powell, including many who were not represented by counsel, 
without informing the juveniles or their families of his 
conflict of interest. By the summer of 2008, Ciavarella and 
Conahan, aware that they were under criminal investigation, 
met with Mericle and Powell to collaborate on their stories, 
discuss how to mitigate the effects of damaging witnesses, 
and encourage the destruction of records. Unbeknownst to 
them, Powell was wearing a recording device during these 
                                              
1
 Ciavarella raises challenges to evidentiary rulings, 
sufficiency of the evidence, and the timeliness of his 
prosecution, as well as claims that his sentence violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and was substantively 
unreasonable.  
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meetings, exposing Ciavarella and Conahan‟s efforts to 
obstruct justice.  
 
By early 2009, law enforcement officials gathered 
sufficient evidence to charge the two judges. Ciavarella and 
Conahan subsequently entered into an agreement with the 
Government under which they pled guilty to an Information 
charging them with wire fraud and conspiracy in exchange for 
an agreed 87-month sentence. Noting that the stipulated 
sentences were significantly lower than the advisory U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines for the charged offenses, the District 
Court rejected the plea agreement, and Ciavarella and 
Conahan withdrew their guilty pleas. Shortly thereafter, a 
grand jury returned a 48-count Indictment. Ciavarella 
proceeded to trial, was found guilty of twelve counts against 
him and was ultimately sentenced to 336 months‟ 
imprisonment, as well as restitution, forfeiture, and a special 
assessment. This appeal ensued. With the exception of Count 
7 for honest services mail fraud, we will affirm the judgments 
of conviction and sentence on all counts. We will remand to 
the District Court to modify the judgment with respect to the 
special assessment as to Count 7.  
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
 
A. Replacement of the Existing County-Run 
Juvenile Detention Center 
  
Ciavarella served on the Luzerne County Court of 
Common Pleas from 1996 through January 2009. He 
primarily served on the Juvenile Court, and in January 2007, 
was named President Judge of the Court, succeeding Judge 
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Michael Conahan who had served as President Judge since 
January 2002.  
 
The circumstances relating to the various counts in the 
Indictment began in 2000. That year, Ciavarella and Conahan, 
along with other county officials, began expressing concerns 
about the serious disrepair and deplorable conditions at the 
Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Facility. Some county 
officials wanted to build a new county-run detention center, 
but Ciavarella advocated for the construction of a private 
facility, which could then be leased to the county. Ciavarella 
along with Conahan helped bring together potential investors 
for this project, including Robert Powell, a lawyer and friend 
of Conahan, and Robert Mericle, a local commercial builder 
and friend of Ciavarella. Powell and his business associate, 
Greg Zappala, ultimately created Pennsylvania Child Care, 
LLC (“PACC”) to develop the new private juvenile detention 
center, and Powell hired Mericle Construction Company to 
build it. In July 2001, Mericle informed Ciavarella that he 
would pay him a referral fee of 10% of the contract price, and 
Ciavarella asked him to make the payment through Powell. 
Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to split the payment because 
Conahan “put the deal together.” App. 1205.  
 
B. Kickbacks to Ensure Completion of the 
Juvenile Detention Center  
 
As part of the plan to help Powell and Mericle ensure 
completion of the project, Ciavarella and Conahan engaged in 
various endeavors to stymie the county‟s efforts to build and 
operate its own facility. Most critically, when Powell had 
trouble securing financing for construction in late 2001, 
Ciavarella and Conahan agreed to create a lease between 
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PACC and Luzerne County to secure a bank loan. The judges 
agreed that Conahan would sign a lease in January 2002, after 
he became President Judge and would have the authority to 
bind the county. The lease, which the judges prevented any 
county officials from seeing, committed the county to pay 
$1.314 million per year to PACC in exchange for PACC 
housing the county‟s juvenile offenders.  
 
In February 2002, after Powell secured financing, 
Mericle and PACC finalized a construction contract, which 
included an agreement that Mericle would pay a $997,600 
referral fee after he completed construction of the facility. It 
was Mericle‟s understanding that he would make the payment 
to Powell, but that Ciavarella would be the ultimate recipient. 
In January 2003, when construction was nearing completion, 
Conahan provided Powell with wire transfer instructions. 
Pursuant to the instructions, Mericle transferred the referral 
fee to Conahan and Ciavarella through a series of transactions 
between multiple individuals and companies to ensure the 
funds were not traceable. While Mericle Construction 
reported the payment for tax purposes, Ciavarella never 
reported the income.  
 
After PACC began operations, Powell and Mericle 
worked to develop a second juvenile detention center, 
Western PA Child Care (WPACC), and expand PACC from 
48 beds to 60 beds. Ciavarella received referral fees for each 
of these projects. In July 2005, Mericle paid Ciavarella a $1 
million referral fee for WPACC and in February 2006, 
Mericle paid Ciavarella a $150,000 referral fee for the PACC 
expansion. Mericle received the instructions from Ciavarella 
and made the payment by transferring funds to the Pinnacle 
Group of Jupiter, LLC, a corporation that Ciavarella, 
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Conahan, and their wives formed in January 2004. 
Altogether, Mericle paid $2,147,600 in referral fees to 
Ciavarella and Conahan. 
 
C. Ensuring Success for the New Detention 
Centers  
 
In January 2002, Conahan appointed Ciavarella to the 
Juvenile Court, a position that Ciavarella leveraged to place 
juvenile offenders with PACC to perpetuate the scheme. 
Months earlier, the outgoing President Judge had removed 
Ciavarella from the Juvenile Court and appointed himself, but 
when Conahan became President Judge, Conahan instead 
reappointed Ciavarella to that position as Juvenile Court 
Judge. By February 2003, PACC had begun operating, and 
Ciavarella started keeping regular tabs on how many beds 
were utilized at any given time. In November 2003, 
Ciavarella and Conahan called Powell into a meeting to 
discuss how many juveniles Ciavarella had sent to PACC and 
what the county had paid PACC for housing the juveniles. In 
2003, alone, Ciavarella detained more than 100 juveniles at 
PACC. Based on this information and on a cursory estimate 
of PACC‟s profits, Ciavarella concluded that PACC was 
“doing very, very well” and that he “want[ed] a part of it.” 
App. 532-33. After Powell responded with concerns about 
cash flow, Ciavarella said “he didn‟t care . . . [and] want[ed] 
to be paid” his share. App. 535-36. The judges told Powell 
that they had formed the Pinnacle Group and would use it to 
purchase a condo, and Powell could use it to make “rent” 
payments. In February 2004, Pinnacle purchased an 
uninhabitable condo in Jupiter, Florida. From January to 
September 2004, Powell sent $590,000 in numerous personal 
and business checks to Pinnacle, identified as payments for 
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rent and marina fees, financed through Powell‟s draws on 
PACC and his law firm, which he kept hidden from his 
business partner Zappala.  
 
In July 2005 and February 2006, Ciavarella and 
Conahan received referral fees from Mericle for the 
construction of WPACC and expansion of PACC. Both 
payments were funneled through several conduits. Shortly 
thereafter, Ciavarella and Conahan again pressured Powell to 
make more payments. In June 2006, the judges called Powell 
into another meeting to discuss how much money Ciavarella 
had made for Powell by detaining juveniles at PACC and 
WPACC. For the year 2005, Ciavarella had detained more 
than 100 juveniles at PACC and had begun placing juveniles 
at WPACC. The judges told Powell, “Look, you‟re in this 
business, we helped you get into it, you‟re making a lot of 
money, you‟re going to give us some.” App. 568. Powell 
testified that he “wasn‟t paying them for any services 
rendered, [but] was paying them because they demanded it in 
their position of authority.” App. 568. Despite his reluctance, 
Powell began working with his law firm‟s Chief Financial 
Officer, Pat Owens, to structure transactions to withdraw 
large sums of cash from his law firm and from PACC and 
WPACC. From August to December 2006, Powell made cash 
payments totaling $143,500 to Ciavarella and Conahan 
through boxes filled with cash delivered by Powell and his 
law partner, Jill Moran, to Conahan and his judicial aide.  
 
D. Failure to Disclose Conflicts of Interest  
 
Ciavarella and Conahan perpetuated their scheme by 
failing to disclose their receipt of payments from Mericle and 
Powell. Also, while obligated by Pennsylvania law to file 
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financial interest statements reporting on outside income, 
from 2003 through 2007, Ciavarella and Conahan filed false 
statements and failed to report their outside income, financial 
interests, or gifts related to PACC, Powell, or Mericle. 
Additionally, though they were ethically required to disclose 
their financial relationships with parties in cases in which 
they presided over as judges, and required to recuse 
themselves from such cases, Ciavarella and Conahan 
repeatedly failed to disclose their financial relationships with 
Powell, Mericle, PACC, and WPACC despite presiding over 
several trials in which they were litigants between 2004 and 
2008.  
 
Furthermore, Ciavarella never disclosed his conflict of 
interest with the juvenile detention centers when he presided 
over the cases of juvenile offenders and committed them to 
detention at PACC or WPACC. In many cases, with the intent 
of increasing his personal gain, Ciavarella disregarded the 
recommendation of juvenile probation officers evaluating the 
juvenile offenders‟ cases and ordered their detention. 
Ciavarella also exerted pressure on the staff of the Court of 
Common Pleas to recommend the detention of juvenile 
offenders, and on certain occasions, as a result of pressure 
from Ciavarella, probation officers changed their 
recommendations from release of the juveniles to 
recommendations of detention.  
 
Following the discovery of this scheme, a special 
master was appointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
review the cases of juveniles who were not represented by an 
attorney and were committed to PACC and WPACC by 
Ciavarella. The special master indicated that “a very 
substantial number” of the juveniles did not knowingly or 
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intelligently waive their right to counsel. Confidential 
Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶ 103. The investigation also 
revealed “that there was routine deprivation of children‟s 
constitutional rights to appear before an impartial tribunal and 
to have an opportunity to be heard.” PSR ¶ 103. 
 
E. Ciavarella’s Obstruction of Justice 
 
In 2007, Ciavarella, Conahan, and Powell learned that 
they were under criminal investigation when they heard that 
witnesses had received grand jury subpoenas. Ciavarella met 
with Mericle in November 2007 to let Mericle know that 
Ciavarella could go to jail if Mericle reported that he had paid 
Ciavarella a referral fee through Powell. Ciavarella also 
encouraged Mericle to destroy records.  
 
After learning about Mericle‟s testimony before a 
grand jury, in January 2008, Ciavarella and Conahan met with 
Powell to coordinate their “stories.” PSR ¶ 45. They 
instructed Powell to testify that he had never given them any 
boxes of cash. But by the summer of 2008, Powell had begun 
cooperating with investigators and wore a recording device 
during his conversations with Ciavarella and Conahan. In a 
July 2008 conversation, Ciavarella, Conahan, and Powell 
discussed how to discredit any testimony by Powell‟s law 
partner Jill Moran if she reported her delivery of Powell‟s 
cash to Conahan.  
 
F. The Indictment and Prosecution 
 
In January 2009, Ciavarella and Conahan were 
charged with honest services wire fraud and conspiracy. Both 
subsequently pleaded guilty before District Judge Edwin M. 
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Kosik of the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, conditioned upon the Court‟s acceptance of 
binding plea agreements with a stipulated 87-month 
sentences. As noted above, Judge Kosik rejected the plea 
agreements because of his concern that the stipulated 
sentences were far below the Guidelines for the charged 
offenses. He also cited the Probation Office‟s presentence 
report prepared in connection with his review of the plea 
agreements, which represented that Ciavarella had continued 
to publicly deny receipt of money in exchange for committing 
juveniles to detention, despite the contradictory offense 
conduct proffered by the Government. Ciavarella also 
essentially denied committing juveniles in exchange for 
money at the plea hearing. Ciavarella and Conahan then 
withdrew their pleas, and in September 2009, a grand jury 
returned a 48-count Indictment against Conahan and 
Ciavarella.
2
 Conahan eventually pleaded guilty to 
racketeering conspiracy and received a 17-year sentence.  
 
Ciavarella‟s trial began in February 2011. Throughout 
the trial, Ciavarella sought to demonstrate that Mericle‟s 
payments were legitimate referral fees and not bribes or 
kickbacks. Specifically, he argued that there was no quid pro 
quo, that is, no agreement that Ciavarella was sending 
juveniles to PACC and WPACC in exchange for payments 
from Powell. As part of this defense, Ciavarella sought to 
prove that Powell was embezzling from his law firm and the 
detention centers in order to support his lavish lifestyle rather 
                                              
2
 On September 29, 2010, a superseding Indictment 
was returned against Ciavarella containing the same charges 
but with revised language to conform with Skilling v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).  
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than to pay kickbacks to Ciavarella. Nevertheless, on 
February 18, the jury found Ciavarella guilty of 12 charges: 
racketeering (Count 1), racketeering conspiracy (Count 2), 
four counts of honest services mail fraud (Counts 7, 8, 9, and 
10), money laundering conspiracy (Count 21), conspiracy to 
defraud the United States (Count 35), and four counts of 
subscribing to a materially false tax return (Counts 36, 37, 38, 
and 39). Ciavarella was acquitted of honest services wire 
fraud, bribery, money laundering, and extortion. Thereafter, 
the District Court sentenced Ciavarella to 336 months of 
imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release and ordered 
Ciavarella to pay restitution in the amount of $1,173,791.94, 
to forfeit $997,600, and to pay a special assessment of 
$1,200.  
 
II. ANALYSIS  
 
Ciavarella raises several issues on appeal, addressing a 
host of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
timeliness of his prosecution, the impartiality of the District 
Judge, the admissibility of evidence, and his sentence.
3
 We 
will address each of Ciavarella‟s arguments in turn. 
 
A. Ciavarella’s Recusal Motions 
 
Ciavarella challenges the denial of his three motions to 
recuse Judge Kosik. His initial recusal motions were premised 
on Judge Kosik‟s pretrial conduct, and his last motion was 
                                              
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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predicated on the opinions expressed by Judge Kosik in his 
responses to letters from the public.
4
  
 
 1. Statements in Citizens Voice Article 
 
In July 2009, months after Ciavarella and Conahan 
entered guilty pleas, Powell also pleaded guilty before 
District Judge Kosik. During Powell‟s plea hearing, the 
District Court asked Powell whether there was “underlying 
consideration for the payments which was part and parcel 
with the concealment of the payments.” App. 29. The District 
Court‟s question was in response to media reports about 
Ciavarella and his claim that he never detained juveniles in 
exchange for money. Powell responded that “there was no 
quid pro quo per se,” that is, no detention of juveniles in 
exchange for payments, and that he had only acted as a 
conduit for Mericle‟s referral fees. App. 29. One month later, 
the District Court rejected Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea 
agreements.  
 
Days after the District Court rejected the plea 
agreements, the Citizens Voice newspaper published an 
article, which purported to detail a conversation between 
Judge Kosik and another individual that the reporter had 
overheard outside of the courtroom minutes after Powell‟s 
guilty plea. The article reported: 
 
                                              
 
4
 We review the District Court‟s denial of Ciavarella‟s 
recusal motions for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. 
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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Kosik stood near an elevator outside his 
courtroom and casually discussed what had just 
happened therein, including an attempt by 
Powell‟s attorney to portray some payments to 
the judges as a “finder‟s fee”—not as an 
incentive for them to sent a steady stream of 
juveniles to the detention facilities co-owned by 
Powell. . . .  
 
How could there not have been a “quid pro 
quo?” Kosik wondered, portending the 
sentiments he expressed Friday in a five-page 
memorandum rejecting plea agreements 
between former Luzerne County Judges Mark 
A. Ciavarella Jr. and Michael T. Conahan and 
federal prosecutors. 
 
The evidence of Ciavarella and Conahan‟s 
judicial prostitution—of their so-called kids for 
cash scheme—was abundant and clear, Kosik 
continued. . . .  
 
App. 71. The article went on to quote repeatedly, with and 
without attribution, from the District Court‟s opinion 
rejecting Ciavarella‟s plea agreement.5  
                                              
5
 The Citizens Voice article reported that Kosik said, 
“Conahan, pounding the same callous, iron fist he used to 
force the county‟s use of the private facilities in 2003, 
„attempted to obstruct and impede justice, and failed to 
clearly demonstrate affirmative acceptance of responsibility 
with this denials and contradictions of evidence.‟” App. 71. 
The article went on say Kosik referenced Conahan‟s “denials 
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After withdrawing his guilty plea, Ciavarella moved to 
disqualify Judge Kosik on the grounds that Judge Kosik had 
improperly relied on extrajudicial statements—including 
media reports and Ciavarella‟s presentence report—in 
denying the plea agreement, and that Judge Kosik‟s 
statements reported in the Citizens Voice article could be 
perceived as comments on the merits of the case and on 
Ciavarella‟s guilt. The District Court denied the recusal 
motion.  
 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse himself 
“in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned.” “The judge does not have to be subjectively 
biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.” Liteky 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994). To ensure the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must 
scrupulously avoid making public comments on pending 
litigation. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
(hereinafter “Code of Conduct”) Canon 3A(6) (Judicial 
Conference 2009) (“A judge should not make public 
comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in 
any court.”).  
                                                                                                     
concerning his alleged offenses, „including the receipts of 
money.‟” App. 72. The article also noted that Kosik “bristled” 
that Ciavarella “„has resorted to public statements of remorse, 
more for his personal circumstances. . . . Yet he continues to 
deny what he terms “quid pro quo” his receipt of money as a 
finder‟s fee.‟” App. 72. Each of these statements that the 
Citizens Voice article attributes to statements by Judge Kosik 
is contained in the District Court‟s opinion rejecting 
Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea agreements. App. 21-22.  
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Ciavarella urges us to rely on the First Circuit‟s 
approach in In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st 
Cir. 2001). There a district judge had spoken with a 
newspaper reporter about a pending case, and the Court held 
that because the case involved a “matter of significant local 
concern” and because the judge‟s “comments were 
sufficiently open to misinterpretation so as to create the 
appearance of partiality, even when no actual prejudice or 
bias existed,” recusal was warranted under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(a). Id. at 169, 170.  
 
This case, however, is different. Unlike in Boston’s 
Children First, it is not clear whether the comments attributed 
to Judge Kosik were ever actually made by him outside the 
context of a judicial proceeding. The Citizens Voice article 
implied that a reporter overheard Judge Kosik “casually 
discuss[ing] what had just happened” at Powell‟s plea hearing 
and “wonder[ing]” how there could “not have been a „quid 
pro quo?‟” App. 71. But despite the reporter‟s implication 
that the statements had been made outside the courtroom, 
every statement attributed to Judge Kosik had in fact been 
expressed by him in his judicial opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s 
and Conahan‟s plea agreements or in the courtroom during 
Powell‟s plea hearing. In fact, in its opinion denying the 
recusal motion, the District Court denied ever having spoken 
with the media regarding a case or person charged and 
compared the Citizens Voice article with its July 31, 2009 
opinion. Judge Kosik stated that “[t]he article‟s sources were 
not extra-judicial, but [were] quoted from judicial filings.” 
App. 30. We agree. For this reason, Ciavarella‟s reliance on 
Boston’s Children First is unavailing.  
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Nor do Judge Kosik‟s statements in his July 31, 2009 
opinion and at Powell‟s plea hearing warrant recusal on the 
basis that they gave an appearance of partiality. Cheney v. 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia is 
illustrative. In Cheney, Justice Scalia issued an opinion 
responding to a motion for recusal based on a trip and flight 
that he had taken the year before with Vice President Cheney. 
The recusal motion cited to newspaper articles, and Justice 
Scalia responded to correct inaccuracies and state that 
“largely inaccurate and uninformed opinions cannot 
determine the recusal question.” Cheney, 541 U.S. 913, 924 
(2004) (Scalia, J., mem.). To the contrary, “the recusal 
inquiry must be „made from the perspective of a reasonable 
observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.‟” Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., mem.) 
(citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548)).  
 
Here, too, no reasonable person who is informed of all 
of the facts would believe that Judge Kosik‟s impartiality 
could be questioned based on the statements in the 
proceedings as reported in the Citizens Voice article. The 
statements Judge Kosik made during Powell‟s plea colloquy 
and in the District Court‟s opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s plea 
agreement were based on the knowledge he gained over the 
course of judicial proceedings. “[O]pinions formed by the 
judge on the basis of . . . prior proceedings[] do not constitute 
a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a 
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 
judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Ciavarella has 
failed to demonstrate such a “deep-seated favoritism or 
antagonism.” Id. To the contrary, Judge Kosik‟s statements 
were merely “assessments relevant to the case, whether they 
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are correct or not.” United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 220 
(3d Cir. 2007). “As such, they do not demonstrate bias, even 
if they are „expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, [or] 
annoyance.‟” Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555) (alteration in 
original). 
 
Finally, we note that under § 455(a), “[d]iscretion is 
confided in the district judge in the first instance to determine 
whether to disqualify himself because the judge presiding 
over a case is in the best position to appreciate the 
implications of those matters alleged in a recusal motion,” 
particularly when “the district court judge has presided over 
(i) an extraordinarily complex litigation (ii) involving a 
multitude of parties (iii) for an extended period of time.” In re 
Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(internal quotation marks, citation and alterations omitted). 
Here, at the time of Ciavarella‟s initial March 1, 2010 recusal 
motion and subsequent renewals of that motion, Judge Kosik 
had presided over Ciavarella‟s highly complex case for well 
over a year, and over many of Ciavarella‟s co-conspirators‟ 
cases, and he was well-suited to understand the implications 
of the Citizens Voice article. We find no abuse of discretion in 
the District Court‟s denial of the recusal motions.  
 
2. Information Received by the District 
Court Prior to Rejecting Plea 
 
Ciavarella next contends that Judge Kosik‟s recusal 
was also warranted following the rejection of Ciavarella‟s 
guilty plea. He argues that Judge Kosik relied on the 
presentence report during his plea hearing, which contained 
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factually disputed evidence,
6
 to prejudge both the strength of 
the Government‟s case and Ciavarella‟s guilt. He also asserts 
Judge Kosik considered media reports as support for his 
conclusion that Ciavarella “has resorted to public statements 
of remorse, more for his personal circumstances, yet he 
continues to deny what he terms „quid pro quo‟ his receipt of 
money as a finder‟s fee.” App. 21.  
 
But Ciavarella has not pointed to any extrajudicial 
source on which the District Court relied. Rather, his denials 
of sending juveniles to detention for money were contained in 
the record, including in Ciavarella‟s plea colloquy stating that 
he was “not in complete agreement at this time on all of the 
facts alleged in the Information.” Supp. App. 60-61. As we 
recently stated, “[t]o warrant reassignment under § 455(a), a 
case generally must involve apparent bias deriving from an 
extrajudicial source, meaning something above and beyond 
judicial rulings or opinions formed in presiding over the 
case.” United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d Cir. 
2012). As there is no showing of extrajudicial sources that 
Judge Kosik relied on, Ciavarella‟s argument fails. 
 
Nor can the District Court‟s ability to preside 
impartially over the remaining jury trial be questioned due to 
its exposure to the presentence report. We have never held 
that a judge must recuse him or herself after viewing a 
presentence report and rejecting a plea. To the contrary, we 
have recognized that “circumstances often may arise when 
                                              
6
 Because Ciavarella did not object to the presentence 
report when given the opportunity to do so, his contention 
that it contained factually disputed evidence is not properly 
before us.  
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the judge views a defendant‟s presentence report for 
legitimate purposes before trying him or presiding over his 
trial.” United States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 
1972). Furthermore, “[i]t has long been regarded as normal 
and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, 
and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant.” 
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551. Ciavarella fails to demonstrate any 
sufficient basis for recusal. 
 
 3. Judicial Response to Citizen Letters 
 
In response to media requests and prior to sentencing, 
the District Court disclosed that it had received nearly 200 
letters from the public regarding the case and authored seven 
letters in response to some of those letters. In disclosing the 
public‟s letters, the District Court stated that it had “not read 
or considered, nor will it read or consider, the bulk of such 
materials in determining the sentence to be imposed [on 
Ciavarella].” App. 42. The Court then publicly released all of 
the letters, with the exception of those requesting 
confidentiality. The seven responses that Judge Kosik sent 
contained the following statements:  
 
February 20, 2009 . . .  
 
Thank you for your letter and expressed 
concerns over the corruption which has come to 
light in Luzerne County, and most seriously 
with the courts.  
 
My personal opinions are in complete sympathy 
with those you express. The only difference is 
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that my personal beliefs cannot guide my 
responsibility and judgments.  
 
As you know, the government has entered into 
an agreement with the defense with regard to 
the sentence which is binding if neither side 
rejects it. According to the government, this 
resulted because of the legally questionable 
Count I of the indictment. To proceed, it would 
result in litigation and appeals which could 
extend any finality in the case for at least one 
year. I need to determine if the government‟s 
reasoning is correct, and I must do so as 
detached as possible. 
 
I am not sure we have seen the end of many 
transgressions in your county. 
 
App. 1507 (hereinafter “Wojack response”). 
 
March 2, 2009 . . .  
 
Thank you for your letter and frank expressions. 
If personal opinions were our only guide, we 
are on the same page. . . .  
 
The prosecution stated the plea bargain was 
reached because of some legal uncertainties in a 
law which prohibits corrupting public service. 
To litigate the uncertainties before finality 
would result in extending the presumption of 
innocence for a least a year. Accordingly, they 
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claim to have been guided by the need of 
closure. 
 
App. 1510. 
 
July 16, 2009 . . .  
 
Thank you for your note concerning the 
pending case before me. I appreciate your views 
and hope that ultimately you can respect the 
final consideration in the case before me. 
 
App. 1518. 
 
July 23, 2009 . . .  
 
Thank you for your letter of July 21 concerning 
the case of two judges out of Luzerne County. 
 
Your sentiments are noted. However, I have yet 
to receive a pre-sentence report which will aid 
in making a decision. 
 
App. 1516. 
 
Feb. 24, 2010 . . .  
 
Thank you for your letter . . . voicing your 
concerns regarding Judge Michael Conahan. 
 
This is just another example of why Judge 
Conahan and his cohort have been indicted and 
expect to go to trial in the federal criminal case. 
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App. 1512. 
 
May 6, 2010 . . .  
 
I thank you for the letter expressing interest in 
and opinions concerning the judicial process as 
it may play out in the case of former Judge 
Conahan. 
 
I appreciate your views and hope that ultimately 
you can respect the final consideration in the 
case before me. 
 
App. 1520. 
 
June 15, 2010 . . .  
 
Thank you for your letter dated April 30, 2010, 
and received by me on June 14, 2010. I am 
sorry justice is so slow, but ultimately I hope 
you find it to be true. 
 
App. 1514. Ciavarella renewed his prior recusal 
motion based on these letters.  
 
When a sitting judge comments on a pending case, he 
or she should heed the clear tenets expressed in our Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges. Judges should adhere to 
the following standards: 
 
[3A(1)] A judge should be faithful to, and 
maintain professional competence in, the law 
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and should not be swayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism. . . .  
 
[3A(6)] A judge should not make public 
comment on the merits of a matter pending or 
impending in any court. A judge should require 
similar restraint by court personnel subject to 
the judge‟s direction and control. The 
prohibition on public comment on the merits 
does not extend to public statements made in 
the course of the judge‟s official duties, to 
explanations of court procedures, or to scholarly 
presentations made for purposes of legal 
education. . . .  
 
[3C(1)(a)] A judge shall disqualify himself or 
herself in a proceeding in which the judge‟s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
including but not limited to instances in which: 
[] the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding . . . .  
 
Code of Conduct Canon 3. Given the Canon‟s clarity, we 
emphasize that writing letters to non-parties about a case 
during its pendency is highly discouraged.
7
  
                                              
7
 Nonetheless, we recognize that the “Code is designed 
to provide guidance to judges,” and adherence is not 
mandatory. Code of Conduct Canon 1 cmt. (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, “it is possible to violate the Code without 
creating an appearance of partiality; likewise, it is possible for 
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The inquiry here, however, is whether Judge Kosik‟s 
conduct violates 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and triggers a duty to 
recuse. We have carefully analyzed the contents of each letter 
and are troubled by the correspondence and the expressions of 
Judge Kosik‟s thoughts on Ciavarella and his conduct. 
Nevertheless, though Judge Kosik‟s personalized responses to 
any letters from the public was ill-advised, their contents do 
not mandate his recusal because no reasonable person would 
question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality under these unique 
circumstances. Nor does our review of the record show 
anything other than proceedings conducted by a fair and 
impartial jurist. 
 
We find that the letters fall into three categories: (1) 
those in which Judge Kosik expressed his personal opinion 
about the case but clearly stated that those opinions could not 
affect his judgments; (2) those in which Judge Kosik never 
expressed an opinion but stated that he “appreciated” the 
recipient‟s viewpoint; and (3) those where Judge Kosik 
neither expressed an opinion nor took note of the recipient‟s 
comments but responded with the status of the case. The 
second and third groups of letters abide by the Code of 
Conduct‟s standards because they merely provided 
“explanations of court procedures,” Code of Conduct 3A(6), 
and took “particular care so that the comment does not 
denigrate public confidence in the judiciary‟s integrity and 
impartiality.” Commentary to Code of Conduct Canon 3A(6). 
No reasonable person could question Judge Kosik‟s 
impartiality based on these letters.  
                                                                                                     
a judge to comply with the Code yet still be required to recuse 
herself.” Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 168.  
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The first category of letters, however, causes us greater 
concern because the letters in that category contain Judge 
Kosik‟s personal opinions about Ciavarella and the case 
before him. Because Ciavarella must only demonstrate that 
Judge Kosik appears to be biased, see Liteky, 510 U.S. at 553 
n.2, we must consider whether a reasonable person might 
question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality based on the opinions 
expressed in this correspondence. As the Supreme Court has 
stated, when a judge‟s opinion is formed by the proceedings 
before him, his opinions do not constitute bias “unless they 
display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 
make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. Because, as 
noted, Judge Kosik‟s opinions did not result from any 
extrajudicial source, but from events occurring in the course 
of proceedings, for recusal to be warranted, Ciavarella must 
meet Liteky‟s high bar of deep-seated antagonism. We 
conclude that Ciavarella has failed to do so given that in each 
letter in which Judge Kosik expressed his opinion, he also 
expressly stated that his personal opinion would not guide his 
rulings. This stands in stark contrast to United States v. Antar, 
where we required recusal of a district judge who commented 
at the sentencing hearing that his “object in this case from day 
one ha[d] always been to get back to the public that which 
was taken from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this 
defendant and others.” 53 F.3d 568, 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1995), 
abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 
(3d Cir. 2001). Judge Kosik‟s comments do not “display [the] 
high degree of antagonism” we found in Antar. Id. at 576.  
 
At oral argument, defense counsel cited the response to 
Wojack as most exemplary of Judge Kosik‟s perceived bias 
and apparent partiality. Wojack had written to Judge Kosik to 
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“search the deepest veins of [his] soul and find reason not to 
let these two judges off lightly,” pleading that “[s]even and a 
third years and some forfeiture of wealth is not severe enough 
punishment to begin the healing of the public trust.” App. 
1506. Wojack said that Ciavarella and Conahan had 
“committed the most serious crime against the people” by 
using their courtrooms as “a business for profit at the expense 
of children.” App. 1506. The defense contends that Judge 
Kosik‟s response evidenced his partiality. This view, 
however, requires consideration of only certain sentiments 
expressed—“My personal opinions are in complete sympathy 
with those you express” and “I am not sure we have seen the 
end of many transgressions in your county”—while 
disregarding others—“The only difference is that my personal 
beliefs cannot guide my responsibility and judgments” and “I 
need to determine if the government‟s reasoning is correct, 
and I must do so as detached as possible.” Wojack response. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Liteky, “[i]mpartiality is not 
gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like 
innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors 
in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never 
render decisions.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). Viewing Judge Kosik‟s 
statements in the Wojack correspondence as a whole, no 
reasonable observer who is informed of all of the surrounding 
facts and circumstances would believe that Judge Kosik could 
not, and did not, act impartially. Recusal was not required.  
 
 4. Overall Perception of Bias  
 
Finally, Ciavarella contends that “the totality of Judge 
Kosik‟s pre-trial and trial conduct conveyed a message that he 
loathed Ciavarella and believed that he accepted bribes, thus 
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warranting disqualification.” Ciavarella‟s Br. at 22. We must 
consider whether recusal is warranted considering the totality 
of the circumstances involved in the proceedings. See, e.g., 
United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 259-60 (3d Cir. 
2012).  
 
Viewing the record in its entirety, it appears that Judge 
Kosik had serious concerns about Ciavarella‟s alleged 
conduct. In his correspondence, in the Memorandum rejecting 
Ciavarella‟s plea agreement, and in his denial of the initial 
recusal motion, Judge Kosik expressed his belief that 
Ciavarella‟s conduct amounted to “corruption,” Wojack 
response, that the undisputed evidence showed that Ciavarella 
committed the county to housing juvenile offenders “under 
circumstances amounting to constitutional deprivations,” 
App. 29, and that due to Ciavarella‟s conduct, “confidence in 
the judicial system . . . may be corrupted for a time well after 
this case.” App. 22. Yet a judge‟s negative view of a 
defendant based on evidence in the record does not constitute 
actual or apparent bias for the purpose of a recusal motion.  
 
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon 
completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill 
disposed towards the defendant who has been 
shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. 
But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias 
or prejudice, since his knowledge and the 
opinion it produced were properly and 
necessarily acquired in the course of the 
proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a 
bench trial) necessary to completion of the 
judge‟s task. . . . Also not subject to deprecatory 
characterization as „bias‟ or „prejudice‟ are 
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opinions held by judges as a result of what they 
learned in earlier proceedings.  
 
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550-51. Here, any negative views that 
Judge Kosik had of Ciavarella do not arise from extrajudicial 
source and do not amount to the extreme animus necessary to 
make fair judgment impossible. See id. at 555. Rather, they 
arose from the very matters presented to him, especially in the 
setting of the rejected plea agreement wherein Ciavarella 
essentially admitted the underlying conduct later found by the 
jury to be criminal. For these reasons, we hold that there was 
no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s denial of the 
recusal motions.  
 
B. AUSA Zubrod’s Statements as a Party 
Admission 
 
Ciavarella contends that the District Court erred by 
excluding statements made by Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Gordon Zubrod at Mericle‟s plea hearing, arguing that the 
evidence would have reinforced Ciavarella‟s defense that the 
payments were not bribes or kickbacks.
8
  
 
Following presentation of the Government‟s case-in-
chief, Ciavarella sought to admit the following statement by 
Zubrod made at Mericle‟s plea hearing.  
                                              
8
 We review the District Court‟s decision to exclude 
evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bobb, 471 
F.3d 491, 497 (3d Cir. 2006). “However, to the extent the 
District Court‟s admission of evidence was based on an 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the standard 
of review is plenary.” Id. 
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Referral fees are a common place practice. . . . 
Fee splitting between the parties, for example, 
between Judge Ciavarella and Mr. Powell, that 
kind of fee splitting is also a common practice 
in the real estate business. . . .  
 
This is not a kickback or a bribe in any sense. It 
is a common practice. It is not a legal quid pro 
quo. It is a common practice between 
businessmen in real estate transactions. Mr. 
Mericle simply paid a finder‟s fee to the judges 
in accordance with standard practice. To him, 
his payment of the fee was what he had done 
hundreds of times before and was not related to 
the office that the judges held or any decisions 
by the judges. . . .  
 
App. 1537. In response, the District Court sought to clarify 
that Zubrod‟s description of referral fees addressed only 
Mericle‟s state of mind and not the intent of other 
participants. The Court inquired:  
 
THE COURT: What you‟re suggesting is that 
any relationship Mr. Mericle had to the juvenile 
centers that were constructed by him or his 
company was entirely different than any 
relationship that may have existed between Mr. 
Powell and the two judges that you were 
referring to; is that correct? 
 
MR. ZUBROD: That‟s correct . . . . [Powell] 
understood it to be a quid pro quo that he would 
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not get juveniles anymore if he didn‟t pay up 
the money. . . .  
 
THE COURT: [I]t‟s my recollection that in the 
case of the two judges you represented that 
there was a quid pro quo between Mr. Powell 
and between the judges. That is not the case [as 
to Mericle‟s intent]; is that correct? 
 
MR. ZUBROD: That‟s correct, Your Honor. 
There‟s no quid pro quo. 
 
App. 1539.  
 
Ciavarella argued that Zubrod‟s statement was a party 
admission that Mericle‟s payments were not a bribe or 
kickback but were permissible referral fees. The District 
Court refused to allow the statements to be used as party 
admissions but permitted Ciavarella to represent that the 
statements supported Mericle‟s mental state concerning the 
payments.  
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) permits the 
admission of statements made by a party opponent. Ciavarella 
argues that “[t]he rule simply requires that the admission at 
issue be contrary to a party‟s position at trial.” Ciavarella‟s 
Br. at 30.
9
 We must consider whether the Government has 
                                              
9
 We have stated that “[t]o be admissible [under Rule 
801(d)(2)], a party‟s admission „must be contrary to that 
party‟s position at the time of the trial.‟” United States v. 
Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Butler v. S. 
Pa. Co., 431 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1970)). However, other 
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adopted inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions in its 
successive series of suits against Mericle and Ciavarella. 
Zubrod‟s statement only referred to Mericle‟s intent about the 
payments and not the intent or state of mind of Ciavarella, 
Conahan, or Powell, which was the focus of the 
Government‟s case against Ciavarella. Zubrod stated that 
Powell “understood it to be a quid pro quo,” while to Mericle, 
his payment was a fee and was “standard practice,” not a 
“quid pro quo.” App. 1539. Thus, the Government‟s position 
at Ciavarella‟s trial—that Ciavarella ordered juvenile 
offenders to detention in exchange for money—is neither an 
inconsistent nor a mutually contradictory position from its 
theory at Mericle‟s plea hearing. Accordingly, we find no 
abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s exclusion of 
Zubrod‟s statements at Mericle‟s plea hearing.10 
                                                                                                     
courts have addressed whether the admission must be against 
the party‟s interest and have concluded that Rule 
801(d)(2)(A) contains no such limitation. See, e.g., United 
States v. McGee, 189 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing 
cases). Because Ciavarella only argues that Zubrod‟s 
statements should have been admissible because they were 
contrary to the Government‟s position at trial, we need not 
address whether to relax our limitation on the admissibility of 
a party opponent‟s statements.  
10
 Moreover, under the District Court‟s ruling, 
Ciavarella could have introduced Zubrod‟s statement through 
Mericle‟s cross-examination. 
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C. Cross-Examination of Powell and Owens 
 
Ciavarella contends that the District Court violated his 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when it limited his 
cross-examination of Powell and Powell‟s CFO, Patrick 
Owens, on substantial facts in controversy that went to the 
core of his defense and undermined Powell‟s credibility.11 To 
determine whether limitations on cross-examination violate 
the Confrontation Clause, we employ the following two-step 
test:  
 
First, we must determine whether that ruling 
significantly inhibited [a defendant‟s] effective 
exercise of her right to inquire into [the] 
witness‟s “motivation in testifying”; and 
second, if the District Court‟s ruling did 
significantly inhibit [the defendant‟s] exercise 
of that right, whether the constraints it imposed 
on the scope of [the] cross-examination fell 
within those “reasonable limits” which a trial 
court, in due exercise of its discretion, has 
authority to establish. 
 
                                              
11
 We review the District Court‟s limitations on cross-
examination based on relevancy for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1005 (3d Cir. 2008). 
We review for plain error objections that were not specifically 
raised before the District Court. United States v. Christie, 624 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying plain error review for 
claim that admission of testimony violated the Confrontation 
Clause). 
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United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).  
 
Ciavarella sought throughout the trial to portray 
Powell as a large and powerful figure, who was incapable of 
being extorted by Ciavarella and instead was embezzling 
from his companies to support his lavish lifestyle. The 
defense inquired into Powell‟s credit card statements, 
confronting him about a December 2003 statement containing 
over $21,000 in charges, a January 2004 statement containing 
over $13,000 in charges, and a February 2004 statement 
containing over $15,000 in charges. After the questioning of 
Powell about his third credit card statement, the District Court 
asked the defense about the relevance of the line of 
questioning and subsequently sustained an objection by the 
Government.  
 
Ciavarella also attacked Powell‟s credibility through 
the testimony of Owens regarding Powell‟s demeanor and his 
structuring of transactions. Owens testified that Powell‟s 
demeanor changed in 2006 and 2007 and that Powell had 
become paranoid, quick tempered, and demanding. Around 
that time, according to Owens, Powell had directed Owens to 
withdraw large amounts of cash from Powell‟s companies. 
The defense on cross-examination sought to demonstrate that 
it was Powell‟s embezzlement from his companies that had 
led to his changed demeanor and not Ciavarella‟s alleged 
extortion demands. However, after Ciavarella had asked 
Owens about Powell‟s business partner Greg Zappala‟s lack 
of knowledge of Powell‟s withdrawals from the companies 
they jointly owned, the District Court inquired as to the 
relevance of Powell‟s embezzlement, prompting an objection 
from the Government that the District Court sustained. The 
Government then conceded that “[t]he issue of paranoia, 
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however, as a motive separate from the extortion may be 
marginally relevant.” App. 729. Nevertheless, the District 
Court maintained its ruling.  
 
 “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 
limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, 
among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, the witness‟ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 
only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 679 (1986). “Van Arsdall requires us to strike a balance 
between the constitutionally required opportunity to cross-
examine and the need to prevent repetitive or abusive cross-
examination.” United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 919 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  
 
Although Ciavarella initially argued at trial that 
Powell‟s testimony addressing his credit card statements was 
relevant to the defense‟s theory that Powell‟s lavish lifestyle 
made him incapable of being extorted, on appeal, Ciavarella 
now argues that the evidence was relevant instead to show 
that Powell was embezzling from his companies to support 
his lifestyle. However, Ciavarella failed to demonstrate either 
at trial or on appeal any different conclusion that the jury 
might have reached had it learned more about Powell‟s 
specific spending habits, and thus we cannot conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion. Regarding Owens‟s 
testimony, while we agree that evidence related to Powell‟s 
change in demeanor and structuring of transactions may have 
been relevant to support Ciavarella‟s argument that Zappala 
did not know that Powell was stealing from their companies, 
we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding this evidence. Ciavarella had already questioned 
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Owens about Zappala‟s lack of knowledge about Powell‟s 
withdrawals from his companies, and further questioning 
would have been repetitive. Ciavarella has not explained what 
the jury may have learned from further testimony on Powell‟s 
withdrawals. As “the Confrontation Clause does not grant 
unfettered rights to cross-examine witnesses,” United States 
v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 356 (3d Cir. 2011), we conclude 
that the District Court‟s ruling “fell within those „reasonable 
limits‟ which a trial court, in due exercise of its discretion, 
has authority to establish.” Chandler, 326 F.3d at 219.  
 
D. Use of Evidence of Ciavarella’s and 
Conahan’s Conflicts of Interest  
 
Ciavarella argues that the District Court erred under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) by admitting evidence that 
demonstrated that he and Conahan failed to disqualify 
themselves in certain lawsuits over which they presided. 
Ciavarella argues that this evidence was not relevant, failed to 
assist the jury in understanding whether the payments were 
bribes or part of a scheme to defraud, and that even if 
relevant, was unfairly prejudicial.
12
 Even if we assume 
Ciavarella is correct that Rule 404(b) applies in this instance 
because extrinsic offense evidence is at issue,
13
 we find no 
abuse of discretion. 
                                              
12
 We review the District Court‟s admission of Rule 
404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion, and “the district court 
has significant leeway in reaching its decision.” United States 
v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
13
 The Government maintains that the District Court 
correctly ruled that the evidence is “intrinsic evidence of 
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The Government sought to introduce evidence under 
Rule 404(b) that Ciavarella and Conahan failed to disqualify 
themselves or disclose their conflicts of interest in cases over 
which they presided involving Mericle, Powell, PACC, and 
WPACC as litigants. The American Bar Association‟s Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct requires all judges to either 
disqualify themselves from or disclose their interest in 
proceedings in which their impartiality may be questioned 
due to their economic interest in the subject matter in 
controversy. Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11 (2011). 
“Almost every State . . . has adopted the American Bar 
Association‟s objective standard . . . .” Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 888 (2009).
14
 Ciavarella 
testified that though he knew of the affirmative duty to 
disqualify himself in certain cases, he failed to do so. 
Multiple attorneys that represented opposing parties in cases 
                                                                                                     
Ciavarella‟s guilt on the honest services fraud counts.” Gov‟t 
Br. at 47. “Rule 404(b) does not extend to evidence of acts 
which are „intrinsic‟ to the charged offense.” United States v. 
Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
14
 Pennsylvania has adopted a similar rule for 
disqualification. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3(C)(1)(c) (“Judges should disqualify themselves in a 
proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including but not limited to instances where[] 
they know that they . . . have a substantial financial interest in 
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding . . . .”). 
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before Ciavarella against Powell or companies owned by 
Mericle testified about the judges‟ failure to disqualify 
themselves or disclose their financial relationships. When the 
relationships were specifically inquired about, Ciavarella 
downplayed them or responded angrily. In each case, there 
had been rulings squarely in favor of Mericle, Powell, and the 
juvenile detention centers. Witnesses testified that had the 
opposing counsels known about Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s 
relationships, it would have affected the counsels‟ handling of 
their cases.  
 
As is relevant to Ciavarella‟s argument on appeal, 
extrinsic evidence of other bad acts is admissible under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) if three requirements are 
met. First, the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose 
under Rule 404(b); second, the evidence must be relevant 
under Rule 402; and third, the probative value of the evidence 
must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 
403. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).
15
 
Proper purposes for the evidence include “motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b). “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion, 
which emphasizes the admissibility of other crimes 
evidence.” Gov’t of V.I. v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 270 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  
 
                                              
15
 As a fourth requirement under Rule 404(b), evidence 
must also “be accompanied by a limiting instruction (where 
requested) about the purpose for which the jury may consider 
it.” Cross, 308 F.3d at 320-21. 
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To determine the relevance of the Rule 404(b) 
nondisclosure evidence, we must consider whether it would 
aid in the proof of a “fact . . . of consequence in determining 
the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(b). For the Government to 
prove honest services mail fraud, it must demonstrate, among 
other things, that there was a scheme to defraud, which 
includes any course of action to deprive another of money, 
property, or the intangible right to honest services through 
fraudulent representations reasonably calculated to deceive a 
person of “ordinary prudence.” United States v. Pearlstein, 
576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; 
see also United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 325 (3d. Cir. 
2010) (setting forth the elements of honest services mail 
fraud). Fraudulent representations include the concealment of 
material facts and a failure to disclose information when the 
defendant is under a known legal duty to disclose. Third 
Circuit Model Jury Instructions 6.18.1341-1 (2012); see also 
Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 1998). 
Here, the nondisclosure evidence serves a proper purpose 
under Rule 404(b) and is relevant to proving that the 
payments furthered the scheme to defraud through 
Ciavarella‟s failure to disclose his financial relationships in 
cases he presided over when there was an affirmative duty to 
do so and by assisting Mericle and Powell with favorable 
rulings during trial. 
 
However, Ciavarella argues that the Rule 404(b) 
evidence could only be relevant to support a conflict-of-
interest theory of honest services fraud, which is no longer 
viable after Skilling v. United States. In Skilling, the Supreme 
Court held that for the honest services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346, to survive constitutional scrutiny, it may only be 
interpreted to criminalize fraud based on bribes and kickbacks 
40 
 
and not based on a failure to disclose a conflict of interest. 
130 S. Ct. at 2931-33. The bribery-and-kickback theory of 
honest services fraud requires “a quid pro quo, that is, a 
specific intent to give or receive something of value in 
exchange for an official act.” United States v. Wright, 665 
F.3d 560, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Thus, while the evidence of nondisclosure 
by itself may not constitute honest services fraud based on a 
conflict-of-interest theory under Skilling, we believe that 
where there is also evidence of bribery or kickbacks, as there 
was before the District Court, then the evidence may be 
relevant to proof of a scheme to defraud under a bribery-and-
kickback theory of honest services fraud. Furthermore, the 
District Court had instructed the jury that the Government 
was required to prove that the scheme to defraud must be 
conducted through the use of bribes and kickbacks and that a 
government official could breach his or her duty of honest 
services through the use of bribes and kickbacks.  
 
Finally, Ciavarella maintains that even if the evidence 
is relevant, it still should have been excluded as unfairly 
prejudicial because it touched on the impermissible conflict-
of-interest theory of honest services fraud. However, there is 
no indication that the Government used the Rule 404(b) 
evidence to demonstrate a conflict of interest, and the District 
Court clearly instructed the jury as to the limited purpose for 
which it could use the evidence and that the honest services 
charges required proof of a bribe or kickback. Thus, contrary 
to Ciavarella‟s contention otherwise, the District Court was 
within its “significant leeway,” Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272, in 
admitting the Rule 404(b) nondisclosure evidence, and there 
was no abuse of discretion.  
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E. False Financial Disclosures as Evidence of 
Honest Services Mail Fraud 
 
Ciavarella contends that the evidence of false financial 
disclosure statements cannot sustain a conviction for honest 
services mail fraud based on a conflict-of-interest theory 
under Skilling, without evidence that Ciavarella accepted a 
bribe in exchange for filing the false disclosure statements.
16
 
Under Pennsylvania law, judges must file annual financial 
interest statements reporting on their outside financial 
interests, creditors, income, and gifts. 204 Pa. Code. § 29.52. 
For the years 2003 through 2007, Ciavarella and Conahan 
filed false financial interest statements in which they failed to 
disclose their receipt of payments from Mericle and Powell.  
 
Ciavarella‟s argument is without merit. While the 
Skilling Court confined criminality under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to 
schemes involving bribes or kickbacks, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 
2931, “[t]he bribery theory does not require that each quid, or 
item of value, be linked to a specific quo, or official act. 
Rather, a bribe may come in the form of a „stream of 
benefits.‟” Wright, 665 F.3d at 568 (quoting United States v. 
Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2011)). As noted, 
concealment of material information through false disclosure 
statements, by itself, cannot serve as the basis for an honest 
                                              
16
 We apply de novo review over questions of statutory 
interpretation. United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 671 
(3d Cir. 2012). “We review the legal accuracy of a district 
court‟s jury instructions de novo.” United States v. Maury, 
695 F.3d 227, 261 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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services mail fraud conviction, but when there is evidence 
that the concealment by false disclosures furthers a scheme to 
defraud through bribes and kickbacks, then the false 
disclosure statements can support such a conviction. Here, the 
false financial disclosures that Ciavarella mailed are relevant 
to both the “use of the mails” and the “scheme to defraud” 
elements. The District Court properly instructed the jury that 
the Government was required to prove that the scheme to 
defraud was conducted through the use of bribes or kickbacks 
through the use of the mails. It also instructed that a 
government official may breach his or her duty of honest 
services through bribery or kickbacks and that the jury must 
find that the defendant engaged in undisclosed biased 
decision making through bribery or kickbacks.  
 
Ciavarella also cites to United States v. Genova, 333 
F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that the “mere 
mailing” of false disclosure statements cannot constitute mail 
fraud because “the mailing of false statements does not read 
like the definition of bribery.” Ciavarella‟s Br. at 46. Genova 
involved the city prosecutor‟s payment of kickbacks to the 
mayor in exchange for the city‟s legal business. Genova, 333 
F.3d at 754. While the Court held that false financial 
disclosure statements were not predicate offenses under RICO 
because the state‟s disclosure requirement “does not read like 
a definition of bribery,” it permitted the false disclosures to 
support the mail fraud convictions. Id. at 758. Thus, contrary 
to Ciavarella‟s position, Genova reaffirms our view that the 
false financial statements at issue in the instant action can 
support Ciavarella‟s honest mail fraud convictions. In 
Genova, the Court held that the false disclosures were part of 
a scheme to defraud because “[k]eeping a lid on the 
kickbacks was essential to permit their continuation” and “[a] 
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jury sensibly could conclude that the false mailings were 
integral to this scheme.” Id. at 759. Here, too, a jury could 
conclude that Ciavarella‟s mailing of false financial 
disclosure statements was “integral” to his scheme to defraud 
through the use of bribes or kickbacks and that the false 
disclosures helped “keep a lid on the kickbacks” received by 
Ciavarella.  
 
F. Sufficiency of the Evidence  
 
Ciavarella next challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his convictions for RICO, RICO 
conspiracy, honest services mail fraud, and money laundering 
conspiracy.
17
  
 
 1. RICO Conviction (Count 1) 
 
Ciavarella was convicted of racketeering in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) based on two predicate acts—honest 
services wire fraud based on three wire transfers on January 
21, 24, and 28, 2003 (Racketeering Act One) and money 
laundering conspiracy (Racketeering Act Thirteen). The 
January 2003 wire transfers involved the $997,600 payment 
from Mericle to Ciavarella and Conahan. In essence, 
Ciavarella contends that the RICO conviction cannot be 
sustained because the 2003 payment from Mericle did not 
                                              
17
 We affirm the jury‟s verdict when there is 
substantial evidence that, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the government, would permit a reasonable finder of fact to 
convict. Wright, 665 F.3d at 567. A defendant raising a 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge has an exceedingly high 
burden. Id.  
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constitute a bribe given the jury acquitted him of the bribery 
counts related to Mericle‟s 2005 and 2006 payments and 
because Mericle testified that the 2003 payment was also a 
legitimate referral fee. Absent evidence that the January 2003 
payment was a bribe, the racketeering predicate act of honest 
services wire fraud cannot be sustained. 
 
A payment constitutes a bribe “as long as the essential 
intent—a specific intent to give or receive something of value 
in exchange for an official act—exists.” United States v. 
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2007). The Government is 
not required to prove that the payments were intended “to 
prompt a specific official act. . . . [Rather,] payments may be 
made with the intent to retain the official‟s services on an „as 
needed‟ basis, so that whenever the opportunity presents itself 
the official will take specific action on the payor‟s behalf.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 
Here, the Government presented the following 
evidence to support the jury‟s conclusion that the payment 
Ciavarella received from Mericle in 2003 constituted a bribe: 
the 2003 payments were transferred through multiple 
individuals to a company owned by Conahan, which 
ultimately transferred the funds to Ciavarella and Conahan; 
Ciavarella agreed to split the fee with Conahan because 
Conahan had done much of the work to confer the benefit on 
Mericle; Powell treated the payment as income for tax 
purposes; Conahan‟s company falsely reported the funds in 
the company books as a consultant‟s fee; Ciavarella worked 
to close down the existing county facility and move its best 
employees to PACC; Conahan, with Ciavarella‟s knowledge, 
signed a lease to assist Powell in securing financing; 
Ciavarella and Conahan failed to disclose the conflicts of 
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interest in civil cases before them; and Ciavarella and 
Conahan mailed false financial disclosure statements. While 
Ciavarella and Mericle testified that the payment was a 
referral fee and not a bribe, the jury was free to disbelieve 
them. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
jury to conclude that the 2003 payment from Mericle 
constituted a bribe to support the predicate act for honest 
services wire fraud and to sustain the RICO conviction. 
Ciavarella fails to meet his high burden. 
 
2. Honest Services Mail Fraud Convictions 
(Counts 7, 8, 9, and 10) 
 
There was also sufficient evidence to allow a 
reasonable jury to convict Ciavarella on each of the honest 
services mail fraud convictions based on the mailing of the 
Statement of Financial Interests in April 2004, March 2005, 
April 2006, and March 2007. For an honest services mail 
fraud conviction, in addition to the traditional mail fraud 
elements and that the scheme was conducted through the use 
of bribes or kickbacks, the Government must also prove: (1) 
“that the payor provided a benefit to a public official 
intending that he will thereby take favorable official acts that 
he would not otherwise take”; and (2) “that the official 
accepted those benefits intending, in exchange for the 
benefits, to take official acts to benefit the payor.” Wright, 
665 F.3d at 568. Because the jury found that the 2003 
payment constituted a bribe or kickback to support 
Racketeering Act One, there was sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Ciavarella‟s nondisclosure of 
that payment in his Statements of Financial Interests 
constituted honest services mail fraud. 
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3. RICO Conspiracy and Money 
Laundering Conspiracy Convictions 
(Counts 2 and 21) 
 
Ciavarella also contends that the conspiracy 
convictions cannot be sustained absent proof of a bribe or 
kickback. Because we hold that there was sufficient evidence 
for a rational jury to conclude that the 2003 payment from 
Mericle constituted a bribe to support the racketeering 
predicate act, Ciavarella‟s challenges to the RICO and money 
laundering conspiracy convictions also fail.  
 
G. Statute of Limitations  
 
Ciavarella argues that the RICO, honest services mail 
fraud, and conspiracy convictions are time-barred.
18
  
 
                                              
18
 “We exercise plenary review over whether counts of 
an [I]ndictment should have been dismissed for violating the 
statute of limitations.” United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 
150, 152 (3d Cir. 2009). However, when a defendant waived 
a challenge to the statute of limitations, then we review for 
plain error. United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir. 
2002). A five-year statute of limitations applies to all of the 
convictions. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). For a RICO charge, at least 
one of the predicate acts must have occurred within five years 
of the indictment. Manna v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 51 F.3d 
1158, 1168 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing United States v. Persico, 832 
F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
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On January 23, 2009, after an Information was filed, 
Ciavarella signed a plea agreement, waiving any statute-of-
limitations defense to charges under investigation in the event 
Ciavarella “vacates or sets aside any conviction or sentence of 
incarceration imposed pursuant to [the] plea agreement.” 
Supp. App. 41. After the District Court rejected the plea 
agreement, on September 9, 2009, a grand jury returned an 
Indictment, charging Ciavarella with numerous offenses. A 
superseding Indictment was returned on September 29, 2010, 
containing the same charges but with revised language to 
conform with Skilling.  
 
Following the return of the superseding Indictment, 
Ciavarella sought dismissal of certain charges as time-barred, 
including the honest services wire fraud counts (Counts 3, 4, 
and 5), honest services mail fraud counts (Counts 7, 8, and 9), 
bribery counts (Counts 11, 12, 13, and 14), money laundering 
counts (Counts 22, 23, 24, and 25), and extortion counts 
(Counts 27, 28, 29, and 30). The District Court denied the 
motion, holding that the charges were timely as of the filing 
of the original Indictment and that that the superseding 
Indictment did not expand on the charges. Post-trial, 
Ciavarella sought dismissal of the racketeering conviction and 
the conspiracy convictions (Counts 1, 2, and 21), arguing that 
the 2003 payment that served as a basis for the convictions 
was outside the statute of limitations. The District Court 
denied the motion as untimely. On appeal, Ciavarella 
challenges those convictions as time-barred, and reasserts his 
statute-of-limitations challenge to Count 7, the honest 
services mail fraud conviction, based on the April 2004 
disclosure statement.  
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1. RICO, RICO Conspiracy, and Money 
Laundering Conspiracy (Counts 1, 2, and 
21) 
 
Ciavarella argues that the two predicate acts for his 
RICO conviction—honest services wire fraud based on three 
wire transfers, the last of which occurred on January 28, 
2003, and money laundering conspiracy—occurred more than 
five years before the September 9, 2009 Indictment, and thus 
the RICO count is time barred. Additionally, the conspiracy 
convictions are time barred, according to Ciavarella, because 
the conspiracy was completed on the date of its final act—
January 28, 2003. However, while Ciavarella objected prior 
to trial to other counts as time-barred, he did not include 
Counts 1, 2, or 21 in his objection.  
 
“[I]n criminal cases[,] the statute of limitations does 
not go to the jurisdiction of the court but is an affirmative 
defense that will be considered waived if not raised in the 
district court before or at trial.” United States v. Karlin, 785 
F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1986). While Ciavarella would have 
been entitled to an instruction on the applicable statute of 
limitations to inform the jury of the need to prove that at least 
one predicate act occurred within five years of the date of the 
indictment, Jake, 281 F.3d at 129, he did not request it. 
Accordingly, under our current precedent, Ciavarella failed to 
preserve this objection, and we will not consider it on appeal.  
 
Ciavarella looks to the Sixth Circuit, which has held 
that while the statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar, 
it is of such importance that it can be raised for the first time 
on appeal. United States v. Titterington, 374 F.3d 453, 458-60 
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(6th Cir. 2004). But this is not the law in our Circuit. Rather, 
we have held, consistent with nearly all of our sister Circuits, 
that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that 
will be waived if not properly preserved prior to or during 
trial. See Karlin, 785 F.2d at 92-93; see also United States v. 
Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is difficult to 
conceive why [the statute of limitations defense] alone, of all 
the defendant‟s affirmative defenses, should not be waived if 
not asserted at trial.”).  
 
 2. Honest Services Mail Fraud (Count 7) 
 
(a) Application of Statute of 
Limitations 
 
Ciavarella adequately preserved his objection to Count 
7‟s statute of limitations by raising it in his pre-trial motion to 
dismiss. Count 7 alleges a violation of honest services mail 
fraud based on the mailing of a Statement of Financial 
Interests in April 2004. The original Indictment was filed on 
September 9, 2009, over five years after the conduct alleged 
in Count 7. This count is clearly time-barred absent any 
waiver by Ciavarella. 
 
The Government argues that Ciavarella expressly 
waived the statute-of-limitations defense through his January 
2009 plea agreement. The plea agreement states: 
 
The defendant further agrees to waive any 
defenses to the prosecution of [any] charges 
[currently under investigation related to this 
matter] based upon laches, the assertion of 
speedy trial rights, any applicable statute of 
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limitations or any other grounds in the event 
that the defendant successfully vacates or sets 
aside any conviction or sentence of 
incarceration imposed pursuant to this plea 
agreement.  
 
Supp. App. 41. As previously stated, Ciavarella signed the 
plea agreement, later withdrew his guilty plea, and proceeded 
to trial where he was found guilty of Count 7 on February 18, 
2011. The Government contends, though, that Ciavarella‟s 
“conviction” was established by his guilty plea, and that “[b]y 
withdrawing his plea, Ciavarella „vacated and set aside‟ his 
conviction.” Gov‟t Br. at 60-61.  
 
We see no basis for the Government‟s interpretation of 
the waiver provision in the plea agreement. The language—
“vacates or sets any conviction . . . imposed pursuant to this 
plea agreement”—clearly contemplates a conviction that was 
achieved due to that plea agreement. Here, Ciavarella‟s 
conviction on Count 7 was achieved not as a result of the plea 
agreement, as Ciavarella withdrew his plea and proceeded to 
trial, but as a result of the jury‟s verdict. Moreover, the plea 
agreement also states that “either party has the right to 
withdraw from this agreement and withdraw any guilty plea 
entered” if the District Court fails to accept the stipulated 
sentence. Supp. App. 48. This is precisely what occurred 
here. Accordingly, even if we found the agreement regarding 
the statute-of-limitations waiver to include this type of 
situation, the waiver was nullified by the Court‟s rejection of, 
and the parties‟ withdrawal from, the agreement. For these 
reasons, we hold that Ciavarella did not waive his statute-of-
limitations defense to the honest services mail fraud count 
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based on a mailing in April 2004, and we will vacate the 
conviction for Count 7.  
 
  (b) Effect of Vacatur 
 
Having vacated Count 7, we address whether we must 
remand for resentencing de novo. Resentencing on all counts 
is warranted “when a multicount conviction produces an 
aggregate sentence or sentencing package.” United States v. 
Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Resentencing de novo is necessary  
 
when a defendant is found guilty on a 
multicount indictment, there is a strong 
likelihood that the district court will craft a 
disposition in which the sentences on the 
various counts form part of an overall plan. 
When a conviction on one or more of the 
component counts is vacated, common sense 
dictates that the judge should be free to review 
the efficacy of what remains in light of the 
original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing 
architecture upon remand . . . if that appears 
necessary in order to ensure that the punishment 
still fits both crime and criminal. 
 
Id. (citing United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 
(1st Cir. 1989)).  
 
District courts should resentence de novo when an 
interdependent count of an aggregate sentence is vacated. Id. 
at 123. In United States v. Miller, the defendant‟s two child 
pornography counts were grouped, but when one of the 
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counts was vacated on appeal, the remaining count had a 
lower total offense level, and thus we held that de novo 
resentencing was appropriate. 594 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 
2010). Similarly, in Davis, the defendant‟s counts for drug 
offenses and for use of a firearm in connection with a drug 
trafficking offense were grouped. 112 F.3d at 119. After 
vacating the firearm offense, we recognized that those counts 
were interdependent because without the firearm offense, the 
total sentence would be calculated differently. Id. at 121. 
 
Here, the District Court combined the offenses into 
multiple groups, each of which received its own sentence that 
ran consecutive to the other groups‟ sentence. In the group 
containing Count 7, Counts 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, and 21 were also 
included because the offense level for those counts is 
determined largely based on loss amount. See U.S.S.G. 
§ 3D1.2(d). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, when multiple 
counts are grouped, the court applies the Guideline for the 
count with the highest offense level. Id. § 3D1.3(a). In the 
relevant group, the money laundering conspiracy, Count 21, 
led to the highest offense level, and resulted in an adjusted 
offense level of 44. See id. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(J), 2C1.1(a)(1), 
(b), 2S1.1(a)(1), 3A1.1(b), 3C1.1. Because the remaining 
groups‟ offense levels are far lower, they did not affect 
Ciavarella‟s total offense level. Id. § 3D1.4(c). With the 
maximum offense level of 43 and a criminal history category 
of I, his advisory Guideline range is life imprisonment. 
Absent Count 7, Ciavarella‟s total offense level and advisory 
Guideline range is identical. Ultimately, however, the District 
Court sentenced Ciavarella to a below-Guidelines sentence of 
336 months‟ imprisonment, which included a 240-month 
sentence for the group of offenses containing Count 7. Thus, 
because the vacated count did not affect Ciavarella‟s total 
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offense level, Guideline range, or sentence, we hold that 
resentencing de novo is not required. Davis, 112 F.3d at 121-
23. However, because Ciavarella was ordered to pay a special 
assessment of a hundred dollars for each count, including 
Count 7, totaling $1,200, we will vacate the imposition of the 
special assessment as to Count 7 and remand to the District 
Court to amend the judgment to reduce the special assessment 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
H. The District Court’s Consideration of 
Evidence During Sentencing 
 
Finally, we consider Ciavarella‟s challenges to his 
sentence. He argues that the District Court relied on improper 
evidence and made findings of fact that were inconsistent 
with the jury verdict, in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial, and imposed a substantively unreasonable 
sentence.
19
  
 
Contrary to Ciavarella‟s contention, his Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial is not implicated by fact 
finding during a sentencing proceeding unless those facts 
increase the statutory maximum punishment. Apprendi v. New 
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 We review a district court‟s factual findings for clear 
error. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc). We “consider the substantive reasonableness 
of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In 
evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we 
consider “whether the record as a whole reflects rational and 
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Grier, 475 F.3d at 561. 
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Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Grier, 475 F.3d at 562 
(“Once an individual has been convicted by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the predicate facts of illegal conduct, 
triggering a statutory maximum penalty, a court may impose 
any sentence on the individual up to that maximum.”). Here, 
the total sentence imposed was 336 months‟ imprisonment, 
less than the maximum statutory penalties, which total 137 
years‟ imprisonment, excluding Count 7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
371, 1341, 1956(a), 1962(c),(d), 1963; 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).  
 
Ciavarella‟s argument that the District Court relied on 
improper evidence in sentencing him is also without merit. 
He asserts that the District Court should not have considered 
Powell‟s testimony, any payments by Powell, or the 2005 and 
2006 payments by Mericle, which the jury had rejected. 
Additionally, because the jury rejected the bribery charges 
and the notion of a conflict of interest, according to 
Ciavarella, the District Court improperly increased his 
sentence based on his failure to disclose that conflict of 
interest to juvenile offenders. But “a jury‟s verdict of 
acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from 
considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long 
as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). 
“[T]he jury cannot be said to have necessarily rejected any 
facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty.” Id. at 
155 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the District 
Court considered Powell‟s testimony and evidence of 
additional payments from Powell and Mericle, and it found 
the relevant conduct was proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence. We find no clear error in the District Court‟s factual 
findings because there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
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support the finding of multiple payments and an ongoing 
conflict of interest.  
 
Additionally, Ciavarella‟s challenge to the District 
Court‟s consideration of letters from the public also fails 
because a “court may consider relevant information without 
regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence 
applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” 
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). While Ciavarella asserts that the letters 
lack reliability, he fails to provide any basis for this 
conclusion sufficient to establish a violation of his due 
process rights. See United States v. Matthews, 773 F.2d 48, 51 
(3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that a court determines whether a 
defendant‟s due process rights have been violated by the 
sentence court relying on “misinformation of a constitutional 
magnitude”).  
 
Finally, Ciavarella argues that his sentence was 
substantively unreasonable. Ciavarella‟s advisory Guideline 
range was life imprisonment. The District Court considered 
the arguments of both parties, including the defense‟s 
arguments for a sentence less than life imprisonment. It 
ultimately imposed a below-Guideline sentence of 336-
months‟ imprisonment having “taken into account . . . the 
factors [it was] obliged to consider under Section 3553(a).” 
App. 1504. When a sentence is outside of the Guidelines 
range, we “give due deference to the district court‟s decision 
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 
variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Here, the 336-month below-
Guidelines sentence, while significant, is permissible. We are 
assured that the District Court properly evaluated the § 
3553(a) factors. United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 219 
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(3d Cir. 2009) (“A sentencing court need not discuss and 
make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors . . . .”). We 
hold that the sentence is substantively reasonable. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Ciavarella‟s 
conviction on Count 7, vacate the special assessment as to 
Count 7, and affirm the District Court‟s judgments of 
conviction and sentence as to the remaining counts. We will 
remand to the District Court to modify the judgment with 
respect to the special assessment consistent with this opinion.  
